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From its idyllic sand beaches on the West African coast to the majestic mountains 
of the northeast, Sierra Leone is one of the most stunning places in the world. 
Unfortunately though, Sierra Leone is not known for its magnificent natural 
scenery.  Rather, it is associated with the gross human rights abuses that took 
place during a decade of horrific civil war (1991-2002) that claimed thousands 
of innocent lives.  In the late 1990s the world media exposed the atrocities com-
mitted in Sierra Leone: rebels were involved in chopping off arms, hands, legs 
and other parts of a human body.  Girls and women were enslaved, gang raped 
and sexually abused; children, both boys and girls, were forcibly recruited as 
child soldiers and made to commit crimes while intoxicated with drugs and 
alcohol.  The causes of civil war that lasted over eleven long years were rooted 
in poor governance, extreme poverty, endemic corruption and denial of human 
rights, thus making the conflict unavoidable.1
Despite its abundant natural resources, Sierra Leone experienced economic 
decline throughout the 1980s, due in large part to rampant corruption.  Rich 
diamond mining areas fueled the conflict between various groups and indi-
viduals.  The exploitation of diamond resources escalated to such extent that 
the diamonds became known as ‘blood diamonds’.  Why did the exploitation 
of diamond resources lead to the escalation of Sierra Leonean civil war? This 
article will examine the issues surrounding the conflict and their relevance for 
the current UN backed Special Court for Sierra Leone established to address 
the crimes committed in Sierra Leone.
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Blood Diamonds
The interchangeable terms ‘conflict diamonds’ and ‘blood diamonds’ were 
originally used in connection with the civil war in Angola.2  The link between 
exploitation of diamond resources and extensive human rights abuses was 
brought to international attention by a UN Security Council Expert Panel deal-
ing with Angola.  Nevertheless, the term ‘blood diamonds’ did not appear in 
any official UN document; instead it was 
a media creation that successfully and 
succinctly communicated the horror of the 
conflict.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
for Sierra Leone,3 established in the after-
math of the conflict (2002), acknowledged 
that diamonds were highly coveted be-
cause they yielded tremendous revenues, 
which would enable the armed factions to 
procure additional weapons and ammuni-
tion.4  Throughout the armed conflict, the 
RUF used diamonds to buy ammunition, 
arms, medicine and food.5  The possession of arms and ammunition by rebel 
groups gave them power to control vast territories of the country, enslave civil-
ians and exploit them in the diamond mines.  The desire to expand ‘controlled 
areas’ into parts of the country ripe for economic exploitation gradually became 
the main motivating factor for all the armed groups and many local command-
ers, which triggered further conflict.6 
Why did fighting over Sierra Leonean diamond resources prompt such blood-
shed? One should keep in mind that Sierra Leone is home to some of the most 
high quality diamonds in the world.  Extensive alluvial and kimberlitic diamond 
deposits are found in the east and the south of Sierra Leone.  World diamond 
experts believe that diamonds from Sierra Leone are mainly gemstones, the clear 
and colourless stones used in jewellery.  As such, they are the most valuable 
stones in the world diamond market.7
How did neighbouring Liberia, which has its own diamonds, become implicated 
in the exploitation of Sierra Leonean diamond resources? Diamonds from Libe-
ria are normally categorized as industrial diamonds, imperfect stones normally 
used in drills and other tools, but of a relatively insignificant value in the world 
diamond market.8  The differences between Liberia’s industrial diamonds and 
Sierra Leone’s gemstones are striking and easily spotted by experts.
According to the diamond import data of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
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Antwerp (Belgium), Liberian diamond exports between 1990 and 1999 were 
equal to around five million carats per annum; however, from 1991 onward, 
diamond exports from Liberia shot up to 200,000 carats per annum.  Such high 
figures were surprising for a country that is relatively poor in diamond resources. 
In fact, most of the ‘Liberian’ diamonds originated next door in Sierra Leone.9
Charles Taylor is a former president of Liberia (1997-2003) who currently stands 
trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone for his involvement in crimes com-
mitted in Sierra Leone.  He allegedly backed the RUF by giving orders, provid-
ing assistance and supplying arms and ammunition in exchange for diamonds. 
Taylor required significant resources to stage the war in Liberia prior to his presi-
dency in 1997.  Although he received some financial and logistical support from 
Libya, it was not enough to conduct continuous military operations led by the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which sought to oust then-Liberian 
president, Samuel Doe (1980-1990).  Prior to July 1997, Taylor’s NPFL was itself 
a rebel organisation and did not represent the Republic of Liberia.10
 
Charles Taylor had a strategic interest in 
controlling diamond resources in Sierra 
Leone to finance his own rebel group.  A 
further element of the criminal plan was 
to destabilize the political situation in the 
country and weaken the West African 
peacekeeping force (hereafter ECOMOG), 
which had been stationed in Sierra Leone 
with the permission of the Sierra Leonean 
government.  ECOMOG was the major 
military opposition to Taylor’s force in 
Liberia.  Even though he continuously 
denied his intentions to destroy ECOMOG, their burgeoning presence close to 
the Liberian border immensely irritated Taylor.  One of the early ‘rebel’ captives 
testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission exposing Taylor’s ‘true 
intentions’ with regards to the invasion of Sierra Leone in early 1991:
“I have decided to tell Sierra Leoneans the truth about this in-
vasion.  I am making a voluntary statement.  I have decided 
to expose Charles Taylor because he lied over the radio that he 
knows nothing about our invasion... We are here [because] he 
ordered us to come and destabilise Sierra Leone because it is the 
ECOMOG base.”11
Taylor was closely linked to the leadership of the RUF.  The NPFL provided 
important military and logistical resources to the RUF, thereby creating an inti-
mate link between the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.12  There were also 
cH a r l E S Tay l o r H a D 
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Yale Journal of International Affairs 0
iryna marchuK
strong connections between Taylor and Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces, who emerged as the leader of the RUF 
in the 1980s.  Several core members of the RUF, including Foday Sankoh, were 
trained in Libya13 alongside other West African revolutionary leaders, including 
Charles Taylor and Blaise Campaoré.14  The fighters who were trained in Libya 
were called the Special Forces and held the highest status within the movement.15 
In 1990 and 1991, the RUF were trained at Camp Naama in Liberia.16  Those 
trained at Camp Naama were called Vanguards, and held the second highest 
status within the RUF.17  The RUF worked side by side with Charles Taylor and 
his NPFL.18  
In March 1991 rebel fighters under the leadership of a former-corporal, Foday 
Sankoh, crossed the Liberian border into the eastern Sierra Leonean town of 
Bomaru.  The attack was orchestrated by RUF leadership together with Charles 
Taylor.  The overwhelming bulk of fighters in the initial incursion were affiliated 
with Taylor’s NPFL rebel group.  Of the approximately two thousand insurgents 
that entered Sierra Leone, over four fifths of them belonged to the NPFL.19
There were no strong links between the RUF and Charles Taylor from 1992 to 
1996.  In the absence of external supplies of arms and ammunition RUF rebels 
were pushed into guerrilla warfare.  In 1997, the RUF entered into an alliance 
with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that was led by Major 
Johnny Paul Koroma.  The AFRC overthrew President Kabbah on May 25, 1997 
and invited the RUF to join the government.  Thus until March 1998, Koroma 
was not only the Chairman of the AFRC, but also the Commander in Chief of 
the People’s Army, including the RUF.  High ranking AFRC and RUF members 
shared a common plan to take any action necessary to gain political power and 
control over Sierra Leone, with particular emphasis on the diamond mining 
areas.20
Charles Taylor sent messages recognizing the AFRC/RUF partnership.  In 1997 
Charles Taylor enacted his criminal plan to take over control of Sierra Leone 
on the AFRC/RUF leadership, thus profiting from said alliance.  Furthermore, 
Taylor ordered the AFRC/RUF fighters to capture Kono and to construct an 
airstrip where arms and ammunition were to be delivered.21  As early as August 
1997, the AFRC/RUF Junta forced civilians to conduct alluvial diamond min-
ing throughout the Kono District.  Later the AFRC/RUF Junta relied on Kono 
diamonds to finance their administration and war efforts.22 
The AFRC/RUF were ousted by the ECOMOG and Civil Defence Force (CDF) 
forces on February 14, 1998 during an operation commonly referred as the ‘inter-
vention’.23  Junta fighters were compelled to flee Freetown.  While fighters were 
chaotically retreating and looting civilians’ property on the way from Freetown 
to Masiaka, the leadership of the RUF/AFRC was preoccupied with regaining 
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control in Kono District, the heart of diamond mining in Sierra Leone.24  The 
plot to carry out a criminal campaign of terror to pillage resources and forcibly 
control the population and territory of Sierra Leone reached its apogee of bru-
tality during the Freetown invasion on January 6, 1999.  When the AFRC/RUF 
fighters entered Freetown, they waged a campaign of terror against the civilian 
population.  They mutilated the elderly and children, gang raped girls as young 
as 8-9 years old, shot civilians, looted civilians’ property, set houses on fire and 
burnt civilians alive in their homes.25  The international community was genu-
inely appalled by the cruelty of atrocities 
perpetrated by rebels during the Freetown 
invasion.  Then-president of Sierra Leone, 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, decided to enter into 
peace negotiations with the RUF leader-
ship to end the bloodshed on the Sierra 
Leonean soil.
Warring parties in the Sierra Leonean civil 
war were called to sign a peace accord 
in Lome, the capital of Togo.26 President 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, then-president of 
Sierra Leone, signed the peace accord with Sankoh, granting the RUF leader a 
position in the transitional government as well as amnesty for him and all his 
combatants.
Conflict began to simmer in Sierra Leone following the adoption of the Lome 
Peace Accord.  Violence continued on Sierra Leonean soil until 2002.  The inter-
vention of the international community became inevitable.  The government of 
Sierra Leone and the international community took the initiative to establish a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone on January 16, 2002. 
The Special Court and Charles Taylor
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established jointly by the Government 
of Sierra Leone and the United Nations in the aftermath of the civil war.  One 
unique feature of the war was the cruelty of atrocities committed by various 
warring factions, particularly the RUF, AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and 
the CDF.  Abuses such as amputations, extreme forms of sexual violence and 
forced cannibalism became a signature of factions involved in the struggle for 
control over the natural and mineral resources of the country.  Most of the crimes 
were committed by Sierra Leoneans against fellow Sierra Leoneans.  Civilians 
were targeted by warring factions throughout the entire period of the conflict 
and continue living with the bleak consequences of the war.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is mandated to try those who hold the great-
T H E  i n T E r n a T i o n a l 
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Yale Journal of International Affairs 2
iryna marchuK
est responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.27  Eleven 
persons associated with three warring factions (RUF, AFRC and CDF) were in-
dicted by the Office of the Prosecutor.  Because the conflict in Sierra Leone was 
also sparked by the NPFL under the command of Charles Taylor, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone exercises its jurisdiction over the trial of Charles Taylor, 
who is charged by the Office of The Prosecutor with crimes against humanity 
and war crimes committed in the territory of Sierra Leone.
Taylor was indicted on March 7, 2003 on a 17-count indictment28 for crimes 
against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions29 
and of Additional Protocol II30 (commonly known as war crimes), and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law.  The Prosecutor unsealed 
the indictment on June 4, 2003 while Taylor was attending peace talks in Ghana 
on armed conflict in Liberia.  Taylor immediately left Ghana and returned to 
Liberia; however, he was forced to step down as the president and leave the 
country.  Then Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, offered safe haven in his 
home country where Taylor remained for three years in exile.  The newly elected 
president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, requested that Obasanjo surrender Taylor into 
the hands of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  Although Obasanjo refused 
to extradite Taylor, he banished him from Nigeria.  On March 29, 2006, justice 
triumphed and Taylor was apprehended at the Nigeria-Cameroon border.  He 
was immediately transported to Liberia, where he was taken into UN custody 
and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone based in Freetown.
On March 16, 2006 the indictment was amended and the number of counts was 
reduced to eleven.  In the amended indictment the Prosecutor of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, under the Article 15 of Statute of the Court, charged Charles 
Taylor with eleven crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II and other serious violations 
of international humanitarian law in violation of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute. 
By his acts or omissions, the accused, pursuant to Article 6.1 and, or alternatively, 
Article 6.3 of the Statute, is allegedly individually responsible for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.31  Crimes such as acts of terrorism, violence to 
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons (in particular, murder), 
outrages upon personal dignity, violence to life, health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons (in particular, cruel treatment), conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen into armed forces or groups, or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities, and pillage are war crimes that the accused is 
charged with in the indictment.  The accused is allegedly individually respon-
sible for murder, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, and other inhumane acts 
as crimes against humanity.  The Court is exercising its temporal jurisdiction 
in regards to war crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred in Sierra 
Leone between November 30, 1996 and January 18, 2002.32  Although some 
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crimes were charged both as crimes against humanity and war crimes, it was 
not necessarily applicable to all crimes, for some crimes were charged solely as 
war crimes due to the existing nexus to the armed conflict, whereas others were 
charged as crimes against humanity because they were committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.
The amended indictment enumerates specific areas in Sierra Leone where the 
above crimes were committed, including diamond rich areas (Kono and Kenema 
districts) that became the scene of the most brutal atrocities during the conflict. 
The indictment goes even further by enlisting not only districts of the country, 
but specific locations within these districts.  One could argue that it was not a 
very smart position taken by the Prosecution to link crimes to specific locations 
within areas, as it put an even heavier burden of proof on the prosecution team. 
Problems arose during numerous witnesses’ testimonies, for example, when 
the same locations were spelled differently on the record.  Hence, the Defence 
Counsel for Charles Taylor in its oral submission of no case to answer pursuant 
Rule 98 argued that no evidence was introduced by the Prosecution for certain 
locations enumerated in the indictment.  The Defence Counsel asked the Court 
to strike off certain locations due to the lack of evidence presented before the 
Court.33 
The Trial Chamber in its Rule 98 decision dismissed the Defence arguments 
and pronounced that it was inappropriate to strike out the names of the above 
locations taking into consideration a variety of languages and dialects spoken 
in Sierra Leone and illiteracy of some witnesses.  Moreover, the Trial Chamber 
clarified that the names of locations mentioned by Prosecution witnesses that 
were similar but not identical to the names of locations that appeared in the 
indictment might refer to the same location.34  One should keep in mind that 
the nature of the Rule 98 in international criminal procedure is to finalize crimi-
nal proceedings in respect to a count in the indictment, for which there is no 
capable evidence for supporting a conviction on the said count, rather than to 
terminate prematurely cases where the evidence is merely weak or appear to 
be ambiguous.  The evidence in relation to the inconsistencies and misspellings 
of various geographical connotations will be evaluated by judges at the final 
stage of the trial. 
The Prosecution argued that the planning and preparation of crimes charged 
in indictment began long before 1996 and that critical acts which furthered the 
plan and led to the crimes often occurred far from the borders of Sierra Leone. 
During the Prosecution phase of the trial, the Prosecution intended to present 
the evidence that would show that Taylor’s plan was to control the territory of 
Sierra Leone through a campaign of terror that began at least as early as 1991, 
when forces supported by him, including many of his own Liberian fighters of 
his NPFL force, first invaded Sierra Leone in March of that year.35 
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The prosecutorial position during the trial was that the access to Sierra Leone’s 
abundant mineral resources was one of Taylor’s primary objectives and that 
Sierra Leone served as a substantial source of manpower to supplement Taylor’s 
own forces.  In his opening statement, the Prosecutor emphasized that the evi-
dence to be heard in the court was to prove that the accused was responsible 
for the development and execution of a plan that caused death and destruction 
in Sierra Leone.  That plan, formulated by 
the accused and others, was to take politi-
cal and physical control of Sierra Leone 
in order to exploit its abundant natural 
resources and to establish a friendly or 
subordinate government there to facilitate 
that exploitation.36
The Prosecution took up the task to prove 
Taylor’s criminal responsibility for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity as 
charged in the indictment in conjunction with all modes of individual criminal 
responsibility.  The evidence presented in the Court was to prove Taylor’s in-
volvement in the crimes alleged in the indictment, along with a variety of forms 
of individual criminal responsibility, in particular committing acts, planning, 
instigating, ordering, aiding and abetting, and otherwise participating in the 
execution of a common plan, design or purpose, commonly referred as a joint 
criminal enterprise.  Additionally, the Prosecution claimed that the accused 
was responsible for crimes committed by persons under his effective control, 
thus pleading his command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
In the course of Rule 98 submissions, the Defence Counsel for Charles Taylor 
argued that the evidence presented by the Prosecution was not sufficient to sup-
port convictions in regards to all counts.  The Defence team has never denied 
crimes in Sierra Leone, which are overwhelming and well-documented.  Most 
of the crime base witnesses called by the Prosecution were not cross-examined 
by the Defence.  The Defence was primarily challenging linkage evidence, thus 
focusing on the cross-examination of insider witnesses.  
With regard to no answer submissions, the Defense emphasized the lack of 
evidence in support of each mode of liability applicable under the Statute (Art. 
6.1 and Art.  6.3) and customary international law (joint criminal enterprise).37 
In its Decision, the Trial Chamber concurred with the Prosecution arguments 
that it was not necessary for the purposes of the Rule 98 to evaluate the suffi-
ciency of the evidence in relation to each mode of liability, for it was sufficient 
if there was evidence capable of supporting a conviction on the basis of one of 
those modes.38 
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The Trial Chamber quashed most of Defence arguments thus dismissing in its 
entirety a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal brought under the Rule 98 by the 
Defence Counsel for Taylor.  Hence, Charles Taylor has a case to answer on all 
eleven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity charged by the Pros-
ecution in the indictment.  Following the proclamation of the Rule 98 Decision 
by the Presiding Judge in the pubic session of the trial on May 4, 2009, the Lead 
Defence Counsel for Charles Taylor sought an additional time for the prepara-
tion of the Defence case, however, the judges found such an extension of time 
unjustified and set up June 29, 2009 as the start date of the Defence case.39 
In the BBC broadcast ‘Diamonds and Justice’, Lead Defence Counsel for Charles 
Taylor, Mr.  Griffiths, claimed that it would be a sad day for Africa if Charles 
Taylor were convicted.  The reasoning behind his position is his strong belief 
that western leaders are trying to threaten African leaders if latter step out of 
line.  The Defence team believes that the entire trial is a testament to the hypoc-
risy of the United States, which exempts its own citizens from the International 
Criminal Court.40
An interesting legal discussion regarding proper pleading of joint criminal en-
terprise arose in the Taylor trial.41  The Defence submitted that the Prosecution’s 
description of the “common plan, design or purpose” of the joint criminal 
enterprise in the amended case summary, specifically, “to carry out a criminal 
campaign of terror [...] in order to pillage the resources of Sierra Leone, in par-
ticular the diamonds, and to forcibly control the population and territory of Sierra 
Leone,”42 was “ill-defined at best” and “not legally sufficient”.43  The Defence 
submitted that the Prosecution had not pleaded a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Special Court as the “common purpose” of the joint criminal enterprise 
in the second amended indictment and that that mode of liability was therefore 
fatally defective.44  The Taylor Trial Chamber took nearly a year to elaborate on 
the applicability of the joint criminal enterprise in the case.  Eventually judges 
followed the position of judges taken in the AFRC Appeal Judgement and the 
RUF Trial Judgement and dismissed Defence arguments.  Reading the Indictment 
as a whole the Trial Chamber was satisfied that the Prosecution had adequately 
fulfilled the pleading requirements of the alleged joint criminal enterprise in 
the indictment, and that it has provided sufficient details to put the Accused on 
notice of the case against him.  The Defence sought the leave for appeal and the 
Appeals Chamber Decision on the aforesaid matter is still pending.45
The Defence Counsel challenged evidence presented by the Prosecution in re-
gards to the Freetown invasion arguing that none of the senior RUF command-
ers were involved in the invasion operation and thus the discussion of Taylor’s 
involvement into the planning and designing of the operation was unjustified.46 
The Prosecution strongly disputed the position of the Defence on the aforesaid 
issue by stating that both AFRC and RUF fighters were involved in the strategic 
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movements to Freetown from various axes.  The prosecution suggested that even 
if RUF rebels had not been among those who entered Freetown, the criminal 
liability would have been in place on the grounds of the continuing alliance of 
the participants in the joint criminal enterprise, including the AFRC, the RUF 
and Charles Taylor.47  The Trial Chamber did not elaborate much on the Freetown 
invasion episode and the proper legal assessment of Taylor’s involvement into 
directing the attack on Freetown is expected to be seen in the judgement at the 
very end of the trial.48 
Witnesses’ rights have often been grossly neglected in the trial.  The Trial Cham-
ber produced numerous inconsistent decisions by denying witness protective 
measures in many cases.49  It caused irreparable damage to the construction of 
the Prosecution case.  Both crime-base witnesses and insider witnesses were 
threatened and intimated in Sierra Leone and Liberia.  They felt ‘betrayed’ by 
Prosecution lawyers when they were flown to The Hague and promised certain 
protective measures to be rendered during the trial, only to have those protective 
measures denied.  Prosecution lawyers 
were put under extreme professional 
and moral pressure by asking those 
witnesses to testify openly.  Most wit-
nesses were afraid for the lives of their 
families and loved ones while testifying 
thousand miles away in The Hague. 
Some witnesses never testified because 
they were not satisfied with the proffered safety measures.  One should keep in 
mind that Charles Taylor is still very popular in the area, thus making witnesses 
‘petrified’ to testify (for many of them) against their former ‘boss’.  Many crime 
base witnesses live in small communities and their sudden ‘disappearance’ or 
a UN car parked next to their house is often an indicator that a person is giving 
testimony in the court.
Conclusion
Sierra Leone and Liberia are unique societies where victims and their perpetra-
tors continue living side by side.  Achieving justice is an arduous task in societ-
ies struggling to overcome bitter consequences of strife and war.  Protection of 
vulnerable witnesses in international criminal proceedings deserves the utmost 
attention of academicians and practitioners.  The courtroom should not be solely 
considered as the battlefield of legal arguments; it is a place where justice is given 
to those who suffered greatly during the course of conflicts worldwide.  
The trial of Charles Taylor is an undisputed milestone in international criminal 
justice.  Some years back nobody would have imagined that Milosevic, Taylor, 
Karadzic and many other high ranked officials would answer for the wrongdo-
wiTnESSES’ rigHTS HavE 
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ings of their dictatorships.  Moreover, the trial of Charles Taylor has significant 
larger implications for future prosecution of dictators responsible for interna-
tional crimes before the International Criminal Court and other international-
ized criminal tribunals.  Prosecution probes into atrocities perpetrated by such 
criminals are often hindered in the countries that suffered from human rights 
abuses.  Nevertheless, the world has been witnessing positive developments 
in the pursuit of the international criminal justice since the trial of Slobodan 
Milosevic up until the most recent trial of Charles Taylor.  Even though Mladic, 
Al-Bashir and many others are still on the world’s most-wanted criminals list, 
there is reason for hope that they will answer for wrongdoings of their dictator-
ships in this evolving age of accountability for international crimes.  The fact 
that leaders of most developed countries are less prone to criminal responsibility 
because they represent the civilized and leading powers cannot be used as an 
argument for impunity.  The age of ultimate criminal responsibility is yet to be 
seen at the international level.
Even though it is still too early to elaborate on the outcome of the trial, there 
is cause for optimism that in the future, justice may be delivered regardless of 
rank or social position.  Sierra Leone is the 
perfect illustration of boundless human 
greed for diamonds.  As the name ‘blood 
diamonds’ suggests, these gemstones 
became a symbol of thousands of ruined 
human lives.  The magnificent legacy of the 
work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
stands in stark contrast to the people of 
Sierra Leone who suffered from some of 
the most heinous and brutal crimes in the 
history of mankind.  The people of Liberia 
who suffered gross human rights abuses deserve justice as well.  They feel that it 
is not fair that Charles Taylor stands trial for crimes committed in Sierra Leone, 
with impunity for crimes committed in Liberia.  The question of whether Charles 
Taylor will ever answer for crimes committed in Liberia remains unresolved 
but should not be neglected, for delivery of justice to the people of Liberia is as 
relevant and necessary as in the case of Sierra Leone. 
-Chansonetta Cummings served as lead editor for this article.
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